News reports are full of optimism about Pakistan’s increased cooperation with NATO on the War on Terrorism now that Musharraf has been replaced with a democratic government. I don’t see this happening. In fact, I don’t see any likely course that makes things better. In fact, for the next couple of years, I think following three courses of actions are the most likely:
- The Government Really Cracks Down on Militant Islamism. In this scenario, the government does what Western critics seem to want: it acts on every piece of intelligence NATO passes it; attacks not just the “low hanging fruit” of AQ and foreign terrorists, but also Afghan Taliban bigwigs in Quetta, the Haqqani family in Waziristan, and every PK Taliban leader and facility connected with attacks in Afghanistan. The result here will be a galvanizing of all the militant Islamists and complete mobilization of all their networks against the Pakistan government and a loss of government legitimacy due to the inevitable increase in collateral damage. This would lead to the decimation of security forces in the NWFP, suicide attacks throughout Pakistan, and the complete breakdown of law and order everywhere. The government might invite NATO in to help, bringing us into a civil war on the scale of Iraq. Even Martial Law with the complete support of the security bureaucracies would not be enough to stop the chaos. Luckily, the army/ISI would step in before things went too far down this road. It would also protect itself from the get-go (and arguably, the country) through mediocre compliance with the government’s initiatives.
- The Government Real Cracks Down on Militant Islam AND Uncooperative Elements in the Army & ISI. When the security and intelligence bureaucracies refuse to fully comply with the orders they are given, the government will be tempted to pursue a course of reform. While this reform is necessary, the government lacks the power to implement it. The most likely result is that the bureaucracy stonewalls the reforms as it waits for a more sympathetic civilian government. However, it could also speed this process up by taking things into its own hands.
- Reversion to the Mean. Political maneuvering leads to a government that is either more moderate in its support for the War on Terror or (most likely) actually sympathetic with the overall goals of the Islamist militants. This could happen through elections, a reconfiguring of the coalition, platform drift, or a defacto coup.
The last is best I think we can hope for – and the most likely.
Here is the way I see it happening: the government will soon learn that no amount of “will” can overcome the constraints and logic of the situation. After turning up the heat on multiple fronts and suffering major setbacks, it will retreat to a position that looks a lot like the one Musharraf pursued, with the following modifications:
- Because it has less legitimacy with the army/ISI, it will be forced to demand less of it (unless it wants to slip into #2, above), leading it to rely more on negotiations.
- More attempted “head-strikes” against militant leaders.
- Increased behind the scenes cooperation with NATO (but no overt trigger-pullers unless it wants to head towards #1, above).
The bottom line is that any improvement in Pakistan’s support for the War on Terror is likely to be short-lived.
– dap
* Another factor that leads to moderation in Pakistan’s support for the War on Terror is that democratic governments are constrained by the electoral cycle, leading to an unwillingness to pursue difficult policies that will not improve the situation in time for the next campaign.
While “all things being equal” democracy is preferable to authoritarianism, Musharraf did have the illusion of a long time horizon. Given that insurgencies take over a decade to defeat, the silver lining for Pakistan’s turmoil is that this democratic thaw is not likely to last more than a few short years, and that the next military dictator (or civilian puppet of the military) might look like Musharraf (hopefully, without the hubris).
